

FINAL PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. BASIC DATA

Organization Name: Conservation International

Project Title: Assessment and Strategy for Protecting Wildlife and Timber Resources in the Gunung Leuser Ecosystem

Project Dates: February 2003 – September 2003

Date of Report: December 22, 2003

II. OPENING REMARKS

Provide any opening remarks that may assist in the review of this report.

In December 2002, the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government signed a cease-fire agreement, which widely was seen as the best hope yet of ending the conflict that has claimed between 10,000 and 30,000 lives since the late 1980s. Terms of the agreement included: an immediate ceasefire; disarmament of rebels in designated areas; free elections in 2004 to establish an autonomous (but not independent) government; and the new provincial government receives 70% of fuel (oil, gas, mineral, forest) revenues. With this deal came significant opportunities to work with the provincial and local governments for long-term conservation and development, and we had great hope that security issues would lessen, allowing field conservation activities in Aceh again.

Unfortunately, after weeks of uncertainty (due to the breakdown of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement – CoHA, in effect since December – between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM, separatist movement and the government of Indonesia), martial law was declared for Aceh through a presidential decree on May 19, 2003. The decree was effective for 6 months, and has since been renewed for a second 6-month period. This means that the military will have total provincial control (over and above the governor), i.e., an active, serving, military general will be Aceh's highest command. The last time martial law was declared in Indonesia was in 1999 in East Timor, prior to its secession from Indonesia. Even before martial law, increased armed contact had occurred between the separatist group (GAM) and the Indonesian military and there also were reports of problems along the Northern Sumatra – Aceh border.

CI-Indonesia has kept abreast of developments in Aceh through communication with our partners there as well as in North Sumatra and Jakarta, especially Floral and Fauna International (FFI), World Wildlife Fund-Indonesia (WWF-I), and the Leuser Management Unit. OXFAM (a UK-based humanitarian NGO), WWF-Aceh and FFI, both were headquartered in Banda Aceh, but have evacuated their staff. On 17 June 2003, a declaration was made barring foreigners from entering Aceh. As of that date, all international NGOs left the area and very few have returned.

From the beginning, one of the fundamental assumptions for this project had been that the political milieu would be conducive to safe operation and conduct of activities by staff. The North Sumatra portion of the Leuser Ecosystem remains relatively "safe" compared to Aceh. However, the current martial law situation in Aceh and the taking over of control by the military violates this assumption absolutely. While it is *plausible* that the assessment team could proceed and visit some "safer" regions in Aceh, with a US travel advisory in place and other security concerns, staff would be at risk implementing this project.

In order to proceed with the work in the Aceh portion of the Leuser Ecosystem, CI would have had to obtain delicate permission from the military and/or police to enter the area – during a time in which all other international NGOs have left the area and essentially all foreigners were

banned. The security situation was enough a concern that WildAid requested that CI arrange for armed police or military escorts to accompany the team during the assessment, which we were not willing to do.

For these reasons, CI decided that we were unwilling to proceed with the project, and requested permission from CEPF in August 2003 to withdraw. It is our belief that the political climate made it unwise to proceed with the project – and that our staff as well as WildAid staff would have been put at risk if we attempted conduct a law enforcement assessment during this sensitive period. It also is our belief that since two-thirds of the Leuser Ecosystem falls within Aceh, that we would not be able to accomplish the original goals of the project in a way that justified this risk.

III. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT PURPOSE

Project Purpose: Trained, equipped and financially supported actors are effectively protecting the Leuser Ecosystem and this strategy is replicated in other areas in Sumatra

Planned vs. Actual Performance

Indicator	Actual at Completion
Purpose-level:	
<p>1.1. Protection strategy implemented and in place in at least one other core area of Sumatra within 2 years after completion of the project.</p> <p>1.2. An effective team of park rangers and other actors, as specified in the strategy, are implementing at least 75% of the articulated elements of the strategy (implementation of priority elements begun by the end of 2004).</p> <p>1.3. 1.3. Ideal scenario for effective protection of wildlife and timber resources, including a strategy to mitigate the current problems, is designed and initial elements fully funded by the end of 2004.</p>	None of the purpose-level indicators were completed.

Describe the success of the project in terms of achieving its intended impact objective and performance indicators.

Apart from successfully completing Output 1, CI's portion of the project did not achieve its intended impact because of the reasons outlined in the Opening Remarks above.

Were there any unexpected impacts (positive or negative)?

Yes. See Introductory Remarks above.

IV. PROJECT OUTPUTS

Project Outputs: Enter the project outputs from the Logical Framework for the project

1. Preparation for assessment completed (April 30, 2003).
2. The reconnaissance assessment is designed and implemented by October 30, 2003.
3. On-site assessment carried out (November 1 – December 5, 2003)
4. Proposal for 3-year strategy drafted, reviewed and finalized (February 28, 2004).

Planned vs. Actual Performance

Indicator	Actual at Completion
<p>1.1 CI receives background information request from WildAid concerning the Leuser Ecosystem from CI Indonesia (April 30, 2003).</p> <p>1.2 Project team set up.</p> <p>1.3 Roles and responsibilities understood</p> <p>1.4 Consensus joint workplan agreed upon, including roles and working relationship between CI and WildAid.</p> <p>1.5 CI gathers background information for WildAid, which may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Description and ecological importance of Leuser NP Park and the surrounding area. • Threats, including poaching, illegal wildlife trade and illegal logging. • Current response to threats by Government and other organizations. • Applicable Legislation. • Infrastructure of Leuser NP • Ranger force location, enforcement authority, duties and responsibilities, recruitment, administration, training, education, equipment and supplies, and salaries and benefits. • Factors limiting effective protection program, such terrain and topography, funding, poor training, corruption or political indifference. • Key stakeholders involved in Leuser protection, including officials from Leuser NP and other government bodies, local and international NGOs, and local community leaders. <p>1.6 Based on mutually agreed-upon objectives, a list of <u>key stakeholders and key areas</u> that should be contacted during the reconnaissance mission(s) and assessment developed.</p>	<p>This output was completed as scheduled. Requested information was provided to WildAid and in July 2003, CI-Indonesia staff Didy Wurjanto and Abu Lubis visited WildAid staff in Bangkok, to work toward a mutually agreeable workplan and clear definition of roles and responsibilities for the project. The CI team shared our grave reservations about proceeding under current conditions – these did not seem to be shared by WildAid. This may reflect an organizational culture that is more accepting of security risk, or perhaps is attributable to WildAid’s unfamiliarity with the on-the-ground issues in the region. A draft Executive Summary was developed during the CI-WildAid visit, which stipulated that the work would carry forward as planned. The security concerns raised by CI staff were reflected only after we insisted during the review of the draft.</p> <p>In addition, CI-Indonesia staff provided:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. background information such as the threats to Leuser NP including illegal logging and illegal wildlife trade, the government of Indonesia policy and response to the threats, annual funding, and the organization structure of the park; 2. the available laws and regulations concerning the park violations, data on the number of forest rangers operated in the area and their locations, and descriptions of factors limiting effective protection programs; and 3. a list of all key stakeholders with which the assessment team could have met, situation permitting.

<p>2.1 Pre-assessment information gathering completed</p> <p>2.2 CI and WildAid develop terms of reference for reconnaissance mission by October 15,2003. Possible objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final determination of makeup of assessment sub-teams, objectives of each sub-team, roles of each team member and reporting procedures. • Final arrangements for vehicles, supplies, and equipment for each sub-team. • Final determination of key stakeholders and areas to visit by each sub-team. <p>2.3 Assessment methodology agreed upon</p> <p>2.4 Socialization of the assessment with local stakeholders</p> <p>2.5 Meetings with appropriate stakeholders and visits to appropriate sites organized for the reconnaissance team.</p> <p>2.6 CI Indonesia staff facilitate and participate in reconnaissance mission by Galster and Bowman from WildAid by October 15-30, 2003.</p> <p>2.7 Reconnaissance mission completed according to agreed-upon roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>2.8 Plan workshop scheduled at end of assessment.</p>	<p>Preassessment information gathering completed.</p> <p>CI-Indonesia and WildAid had discussed the draft of the TOR, agreed upon the establishment of the Sub-teams, their objectives, and reporting procedures.</p> <p>CI-Indonesia and WildAid had discussed the responsibilities of each party especially in the field implementation, method of conducting assessment, and key stakeholders to be visited.</p> <p>CI-Indonesia has contacted some of the listed key stakeholders (Jakarta and Medan), and informed them about the assessment plans.</p> <p>CI-Indonesia has also contacted several Vehicles Rentals to get information on suitable cars (4WD) and rates.</p> <p>CI-Indonesia processed the required permits for the assessment team to visit Aceh and to work in the field, but failed as in the middle of the process, the CoHa broke down, and the martial law authority did not give such permit.</p> <p>Other indicators not completed.</p>
	<p>Not completed.</p>

<p>3.1 CI/WildAid reconnaissance team brief CI/WildAid assessment team upon arrival.</p> <p>3.2 CI/WildAid assessment team carry out on-site assessment (~November 1 – December 5, 2003).</p> <p>3.3. CI Indonesia arranges and participates in all on-site assessment activities, including:</p> <p><u>proposed activities by team responsible for assessing illegal trade in wildlife and timber, which may include:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Visits to markets to determine extent of local wildlife trade. 2. Visits to stores, airports and hotels to determine species and type of wildlife products available to non-local consumers. 3. Visits to businesses where wildlife products are processed. 4. Interviews with Leuser NP officials to determine species illegally poached and entered into local and international trade. 5. Interviews with government officials about legislation and regulations concerning local and international wildlife trade. 6. Interviews with government officials to determine how timber concessions are granted and regulated. 7. Interviews with CITES authorities to determine levels of international trade in CITES-listed species and procedures for regulation. 8. Interviews with Customs officials concerning international trade control efforts. 9. Interviews with representatives from large timber companies to determine requirements for timber concessions. 10. Interviews with police and other law enforcement agencies to determine their cooperation on issues involving illegal wildlife and timber trade. 11. Interviews with key NGO's involved in trade and timber issues. 12. Identifying factors limiting efforts to curb illegal wildlife and timber trade, such as low funding, poor training, corruption, disinterest in resource protection by government and attitude by local communities. <p><u>proposed activities by team responsible for assessing patrol tactics, which may include:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interviewing Leuser NP officials concerning legislation and regulations for Park protection, Ranger force location, enforcement authority, duties and responsibilities, recruitment, administration, training, education, equipment and supplies, and salaries and benefits. 2. Patrolling with Rangers from Leuser NP, evaluating current status of equipment and supplies and expertise in patrol tactics. 3. Identifying key stakeholders involved in Leuser protection, including officials from Leuser NP and other government bodies, local and international NGOs, and local community leaders. 4. Identifying factors limiting effective Ranger protection program for Leuser NP, such as terrain and topography, funding, training, morale, corruption within ranks or indifference by Park officials. 5. Identify other law enforcement agencies that may be able to render support to patrol activities. 6. Identify potential medical problems and means for evacuation of sick or injured Rangers. 7. Determine the relationship between Park law enforcement personnel and communities in close proximity to the Park. <p><u>proposed activities by team responsible for assessing special security, which may include:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interviewing selected persons to assess corruption within government that is adversely affecting efforts to protect wildlife and timber resources. 	<p>Not completed.</p>
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1.1 CI and WildAid agree on the salient features to be included in a 3-year strategy, in outline form.	Not completed
1.2 CI reviews and provides comments on the first draft report to WildAid concerning the threats and needs assessment and a 3-year strategy for protection (January 25, 2004).	
1.3 CI Indonesia reviews and provides comments on the second draft report to WildAid concerning the threats and needs assessment and a 3-year strategy for protection (February 5, 2004).	
4.4 WildAid and CI Indonesia submit joint report to CEPF by February 28, 2004.	

Describe the success of the project in terms of delivering the intended outputs.

Despite the best of intentions to carry out this project, CI only completed deliverables of Output 1 before making an institutional decision that proceeding with the project was too risky in terms of staff security.

Were any outputs unrealized? If so, how has this affected the overall impact of the project?

Outputs 2-4 were not realized and therefore the project impact was not as planned. Further, because it is not possible to safely conduct the assessment in Aceh (which comprises about two-thirds of the Leuser Ecosystem), it is our belief that an assessment carried out only in the Northern Sumatra province would not have accomplished the original goals of the project in a way that justifies this risk. Additionally, because the responsibility for law enforcement lies with the government and the only role NGOs can have is in training, after investigating the situation in depth, we did not believe that such an assessment would have met the local context needs. Despite this, it is our understanding WildAid would like to proceed with the assessment and completion of Outputs 2-4, perhaps with another partner.

V. SAFEGUARD POLICY ASSESSMENTS

Provide a summary of the implementation of any required action toward the environmental and social safeguard policies within the project.

None.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PROJECT

Describe any lessons learned during the various phases of the project. Consider lessons both for future projects, as well as for CEPF's future performance.

Project Design Process: (aspects of the project design that contributed to its success/failure)

The most important lesson learned in this project is that it is essential to know your partner well before proceeding with potentially sensitive projects, and to plan as well as possible for the unexpected. In particular, in the case of security issues, it is important that each partner know and understand each other's comfort level with risk and that agreement is reached as to acceptable levels of risk. It is essential that an external partner which has not worked in a country be sensitive to the local context and to implicitly trust the in-country partner to gauge safety and security and conductivity of local conditions to project implementation.

This project would have benefited from more face-to-face meetings in Indonesia and improved communications between the CI Indonesia staff and the WildAid Thailand team and enhanced understanding of the values and styles of both organizations. We did not fully understand some of the critical differences until after the project had begun, which was a shortcoming on our part.

Finally, although it is difficult to imagine the form of a contingency plan to deal with the martial law crisis, this project might have benefited from a project workplan that had contingency plan(s) in place for unforeseen security circumstances.

Project Execution: (aspects of the project execution that contributed to its success/failure)

Although we did not learn this until the implementation phase of Output 1, it is quite clear that Indonesia and Thailand have very different values in terms of protection and use of National Parks. For example, it only became apparent during the CI team's site visit to Pokor National Park in Thailand that WildAid's approach was more forceful than what CI (and Indonesia) was comfortable with (e.g., people were excluded from the park and arrested and handcuffed if caught even with 'innocuous' non-timber forest products such as bamboo). This type of approach would not work in Indonesia, where local people are encouraged to benefit from National Parks. It was very difficult for our staff to successfully impart to the WildAid group that these tactics would not be appropriate in the Indonesian context, which led to a great deal of frustration on our part.

Finally, the ultimate reason that we did not complete this project was beyond our control. A fundamental assumption for this project had been that the political milieu would be conducive to safe operation and conduct of activities by staff. The martial law situation in Aceh and the taking over of control by the military violates this assumption absolutely and made it impossible for us to safely proceed with the project.

VII. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The issues that led to CI's withdrawal from the project did not pertain to the partnership or with WildAid as an organization – WildAid conducted itself with utmost professionalism throughout all our interactions. The two organizations have very different philosophies and values, which we did not fully understand until the project was underway.

Because it is not possible to safely conduct the assessment in Aceh (which comprises about two-thirds of the Leuser Ecosystem), it is our belief that an assessment carried out only in the Northern Sumatra province likely will not be relevant once martial law is lifted in Aceh. Additionally, because the responsibility for law enforcement lies with the government and the only role NGOs can have is in training, after investigating the situation in depth, we believe that the design of this project combined with WildAid's approach likely will not meet the local context needs. It is our understanding WildAid would like to proceed with the assessment and completion of Outputs 2-4 with another partner. CI would like to register strong reservations about the project's continuation under current conditions.

For more information about this project, please contact:

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